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ABSTRACT
We examine the relationship between political uncertainty and R&D investment by exploit-
ing the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in
uncertainty. In contrast to the literature documenting negative effects of political uncertain-
ty on real investment, we find that uncertainty over government policy encourages firm-level
R&D. Firms increase R&D investments by an average of 4.6% in election years relative to
non-election years. The uncertainty effect is stronger in hotly contested elections, in politi-
cally sensitive and hard-to-innovate industries, and in firms subject to higher growth options
and greater product market competition. Our findings suggest that, as predicted by models of
investment under uncertainty, the real effects of political uncertainty depend on the properties
of the investment and the degree of product market competition and therefore the total effect
of political uncertainty on the long-run growth of an economy is unclear.
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1. Introduction
A recent literature has documented that political uncertainty has adverse real effects on the
economy1. Drawing on real options theory of investment irreversibility, the standard argument is
that uncertainty exerts a strong negative effect on capital investment by increasing the value of
waiting to invest. The negative relationship between various measures of political uncertainty and
fixed investment have led researchers to conclude that policy makers should be mindful of the dam-
age that lengthy debates about policy may inflict on the economy. However, not all investments
are expected to decline with increased uncertainty. For example, some investments, such as R&D,
may respond differently to uncertainty because of its long time-to-build and high technical uncer-
tainty (e.g., Grossman and Shapiro (1986), Pindyck (1993), and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)). In
this paper, we use panel data on individual firms to provide novel and causal empirical evidence on
how uncertainty affects both the level and the timing of R&D investment. Using the quasi-natural
experiment created by the U.S. gubernatorial elections over the 1976 to 2013 period as a source
of plausibly exogenous increase in political uncertainty, we show that heightened political uncer-
tainty about government policies encourages firm’s R&D investment. This finding implies that the
long-run implications of political uncertainty are unclear.
A large body of theoretical literature has investigated the effect of uncertainty on investment.
However, different theories emphasize different channels, some pointing to a positive relationship
and some to a negative relationship. The real options models establish that increased uncertainty
depresses current investment by emphasizing that the interaction of capital irreversibility and un-
certainty generates positive option value to defer investment (e.g., Bernanke (1983), McDonald and
Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The idea is simple: by deferring the project and keeping
the option alive, the firm incurs a loss of current profits but may avoid costly mistake by waiting
for additional information about the uncertain future. Thus, deferring (partly) dissolves uncertain-
1For example, Julio and Yook (2012), Gulen and Ion (2015), Baker, Bloom and Davis (2014), and Jens (2013)
show that real investment declines with higher political uncertainty, Colak, et al (2014) find lower IPO volume, and
Gao and Qi (2013) find higher financing costs.
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ty. Uncertainty increases the value of the deferring option thereby making it optimal to postpone
investment. R&D investment is highlighted in this literature as a particularly relevant example of
extremely irreversible capital with costly adjustment because R&D is often project-specific and a
substantial part of R&D supports the salaries of research personnel (i.e., scientists and engineers)
and cannot be recouped if projects fail (e.g., Grabowski (1968) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). In
this case, the adverse effect of uncertainty on R&D, therefore, is likely to be more severe than on
other types of investment.
While the real options literature emphasizes that adjustment costs and partial irreversibility may
cause firms to defer R&D investment in the face of heightened uncertainty, subsequent theoretical
research has explored several other mechanisms that may restrict a firm’s ability to wait and lead to
early investment. The uncertainty-investment sensitivity also depends on the type of uncertainty.
Pindyck (1993) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) show that uncertainty over the difficulty and the
duration of completing a project drives the firm to launch R&D sooner, because R&D projects’
high technical uncertainty and long research duration will be dissolved, not by waiting but only by
finishing the project. The theoretical rationale for early investment under uncertainty is explained
by the “good vs. bad news principle” emphasized in Oi (1961), Hartman (1972, 1976) and Abel
(1983), who highlight the fact that firms can expand to exploit good news and contract to insure
against bad news, making them potentially risk seeking in an uncertain environment. An additional
channel through which uncertainty can potentially spur R&D is emphasized in Bloom and Van
Reenen (2002), who analyze patents as options. As patents provide the firm a legal right to prevent
imitation and discourage entrants in the product market, investment in R&D that eventually gets
embodied in a patent can be (at least partially) recouped by selling the intellectual property rights.
This partially offsets the irreversibility of R&D investment and leads to sooner R&D investment
under uncertainty. In this case, filing a patent can be viewed as acquiring a reversibility option on
R&D investment.
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The intuition for why R&D may respond positively to heightened political uncertainty is s-
traightforward. Investments that proceed in stages, such as R&D (Berk, Green and Naik (2004)),
change the trade-off between early commitment and delaying investment. Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1996) embed investment lags in a standard model of investment under uncertainty. Without in-
vestment lags, increases in investment increases the value of waiting but not the opportunity cost
of lost cash flows from investing early. Increases in uncertainty increase the probability of bad
outcomes and waiting can allow the firm to avoid bad decisions. But since the firm can invest
immediately, the opportunity cost of waiting is independent of uncertainty. With investment lags,
however, the opportunity cost of waiting also increases with uncertainty since a firm that delays
the initial investment also delays when cash flows are received upon completion of the project.
The fact that the opportunity cost of waiting increases with uncertainty along with the ability to
abandon makes it possible that the incentive to invest early increases with uncertainty, even if
abandonment is costly.
Another key feature of R&D investments is that they cannot be held independently of strategic
considerations. For example, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) develop a strategic growth options
model to show that under imperfect competition, increased uncertainty may encourage current
investment in future growth options. They consider an initial investment under uncertainty as the
acquisition of future growth options, which allow the firm to take competitive advantages.2 Weeds
(2002) considers a real options model with R&D competition and finds that uncertainty leads to
early investment when the expected benefit of preemption outweighs the option value of delay.
2A firm’s competitive advantages can take many forms. As pointed out by Barney (1991), a firm is said to possess a
competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any
current or potential competitors. In this regard, R&D does well to generate a firm’s competitive advantages, because
the outcomes of R&D are valuable, unique and difficult to imitate and substitute (e.g., Porter and Millar (1985),
Barney (1991), Lengnick-Hall (1992) and Amit and Schoemaker (1993)). Importantly, R&D is a critical input in
innovation and this literature considers firm’s innovation activities as the cornerstone of their competitive advantages.
The technological change induced by R&D significantly increases the productivity and boosts endogenous growth for
firms (e.g., Arrow (1962), Hall (2002), Bond et al. (2003), McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010) and Holmes et al.
(2011)). This strategic benefit of R&D investment is more pronounced under a competitive environment in which the
value of growth options easily expire.
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The idea is that due to the threat of preemption induced by strategic rivalry, a firm fears that a
competitor may seize an advantage by acting first.
Estimating the effects predicted by the theories of R&D investment under uncertainty has
proven challenging due to the difficulty both of measuring uncertainty and of establishing causal-
ity. The relatively sparse empirical literature on this issue finds only mixed results. Minton and
Schrand (1999) use cash flow volatility as a proxy for uncertainty about future cash flows and
find that firms with higher cash flow volatility invest less in R&D. Goel and Ram (2001) consid-
er a panel of OECD countries to show that inflation rate uncertainty tends to reduce aggregate
R&D investment. Using cross-sectional data on German manufacturing firms, a series of papers
by Czarnitzki and Toole (2007, 2011, 2012) document that current R&D investment falls as uncer-
tainty about sales of new products increases. While the finding of a negative relationship between
firm-specific or macro-based measures of uncertainty and R&D investment is consistent with the
existence of real options, those realized (or backward-looking) measures of uncertainty raise a
number of identification issues which call into question the reliability of the finding. The first is
that of an omitted variable bias. It is possible that an unobservable factor may be causing changes
in both uncertainty and firm R&D investment. A second issue is that of a possible reverse causali-
ty. For example, the decision to undertake a risky R&D investment project may introduce elevated
uncertainty over the firm’s future stock returns and/or cash flows.3 In attempting to address these
endogeneity issues, Stein and Stone (2013) use firms’ exposure to exogenous variations in ener-
gy and currency option-implied volatility derived from firms’ equity options as an instrument for
firm-specific uncertainty, finding that uncertainty is positively correlated with R&D investment.
3There has been criticisms that the choice of volatility in stock returns may be unsuitable as a proxy variable for
uncertainty. For example, Shiller (1989) and Schwert (1989) suggest that the volatility in stock market returns may
be driven by speculative bubbles as much as by fluctuations in economic fundamentals. Further, Kothari, Laguerre
and Leone (2002) provide empirical evidence for reverse causality by showing that investment can lead to heightened
uncertainty, and Minton and Schrand (1999) explicitly recognize that their results are particularly susceptible to criti-
cisms related to endogeneity issues and omitted correlated variables, as volatility is only a choice variable chosen as
one of several joint managerial decisions.
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In this paper, we overcome these empirical challenges by utilizing explicitly a proxy for politi-
cal uncertainty that is uncorrelated with other determinants of R&D to examine its likely economic
impact on R&D investment in a large sample of U.S. publicly listed firms. Specifically, we exploit
the quasi-natural experiment created by the U.S. gubernatorial elections over the 1976 to 2013
period as a natural source of plausibly exogenous shocks in political uncertainty. We define polit-
ical uncertainty as the uncertainty regarding the election outcomes and government policies. We
study political uncertainty in the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections for a number of reasons.
First, elections of state governors have implications for corporate decisions.4 State governors have
substantial power in influencing state-level policy-making (e.g., Peltzman (1987) and Ang and
Longstaff (2012)). During the election process, politicians with likely different policy preferences
are elected. Thus, gubernatorial elections introduce political uncertainty about state leadership
and almost all sorts of state government policies such industry regulation, fiscal, monetary and
trade policy and taxation, many directly or indirectly affecting firms’ R&D decisions.5 Second,
the timing of gubernatorial elections is exogenously determined by law and not affected by general
economic conditions. Using gubernatorial elections as a source of political uncertainty mitigates
endogeneity concerns that changes in R&D investment may be caused by changes in business cy-
cles or state economic conditions. Third, unlike U.S. presidential elections, gubernatorial elections
in different states occur in different years, which provides us both cross-state and time-series vari-
ation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to test our main hypothesis. Finally, focusing our
analyses on U.S. firms and U.S gubernatorial elections helps to alleviate concerns that omitted
variables could lead to a spurious association between R&D investment and political uncertain-
ty, because U.S. firms located in different states share the same national political business cycles,
have similar constraints in accessing capital markets, and share common cultural norms. Addi-
4A growing literature has documented that firms face political uncertainty before elections. See, for example, Julio
and Yook (2012, 2014) and Gao and Qi (2013) for surveys.
5According to the 2014 Global Innovation Index report, political stability and government effectiveness under the
political environment category are rated as the top two most influential factors in affecting innovation activities. See
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/userfiles/file/reportpdf/GII-2014-v5.pdf for details.
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tional discussion on the appropriateness of using gubernatorial elections as the proxy for political
uncertainty is provided in §2.1.
We start our empirical investigation by examining whether changes in political uncertainty
leads to changes in firms’ R&D investments around the election cycle. We do so by exploiting
the quasi-natural experiment created by the U.S. gubernatorial elections over the 1976 to 2013
period as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in political uncertainty. Our main results
are striking. We find that, controlling for changing firm characteristics and state macroeconomic
conditions, firms’ R&D intensities, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets, increase
by an average of 4.6% in election years, relative to the non-election year average across all firms.
This suggests that increased political uncertainty related to elections may indeed encourage firm
R&D investments in election years, which is consistent with a theoretical literature emphasizing
that when investment has strategic value, growth options and strategic preemption may dominate
uncertainty’s depressing effects on R&D and drive the firm to launch R&D projects earlier in
the face of political uncertainty. The results are robust to various empirical specifications, various
measures of R&D intensities, a placebo (falsification) test with randomly generated election events,
and various susbsamples. In addition, our overall inference is unchanged when we move from OLS
estimation of a static model to estimation using the dynamic GMM panel estimator.
Our identification strategy behind the primary results assumes that political uncertainty is on
average higher in election years relative to non-election years. While this seems to be a reason-
able assumption, there is some concern for possible reverse causality in this estimation. In order
to establish causality and cross-validate our main hypothesis, we further exploit variations in the
degree of political uncertainty induced by elections and their likely economic impact across states
and over time. The impact of electoral uncertainty on R&D should depend on both the predictabil-
ity of an election’s outcomes and the probability that a policy shift will occur. Hotly contested
elections introduce exogenous shocks and can be viewed as better proxies for political uncertainty.
(e.g., Snowberg, Wolfers and Zizewitz (2007)). The idea is that hotly contested elections entail
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more uncertainty about the eventual winner and future policy and therefore are associated with a
higher degree of political uncertainty, which in turn causes a greater spike in election year R&D.
Following Julio and Yook (2012) and Jens (2013), we measure hotly contested elections using vote
difference and term-limit expiration, which we describe in detail in subsection 3.2. Consistent with
the prediction, we find that the positive effect of political uncertainty on R&D intensity is mainly
driven by hotly contested elections in which the electoral uncertainty and competition are likely to
be high. Although our identification strategy is less vulnerable to potential reverse causality, this
finding further helps strengthen the causality that indeed runs from political uncertainty to R&D,
further confirming the main hypothesis.
Political uncertainty is not the only economic channel through which firm’s R&D investment
can be affected around the timing of gubernatorial elections. Starting from Nordhaus (1975) and
Rogoff (1987), models of political business cycles argue that incumbents may opportunistically
adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to generate low unemployment rate and high eco-
nomic growth before elections, in order to appease voters and increase chances of being re-elected.
Under this scenario, our results may merely reflect the peaks and troughs of the political business
cycle. For example, they might reduce state taxes and increase public expenditures, which may
also contribute to the election year spike in R&D investment. Thus, the political business cycles
hypothesis predicts that average economic activity should be higher just prior to the election. If
the opportunistic political business cycles hypothesis is the driving force behind our main findings,
we expect to see that the election year increase in R&D should be less pronounced in term-limited
elections in which incumbents are ineligible for re-election and are supposed to have little incen-
tive to manipulate firm investment to influence election outcomes. To directly test the opportunistic
political cycle hypothesis, we distinguish elections in which incumbents are eligible for re-election
and elections in which incumbents face term limits. We find that there is a even larger increase
in R&D investment before term-limited elections. A larger increase before term-limited elections
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is thus consistent with the political uncertainty hypothesis but not the hypothesis that firms are
manipulating investment.
It is well known that the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. political system have
different political agendas that influence economic outcomes and corporate activities differently.
In terms of R&D policy, Democrats tend to engage in specific, identifiable goals, such as safe and
clean energy, to foster innovation. In contrast, Republicans prefer to create the general conditions
and incentives to encourage innovation in many areas. For example, they may prefer low corporate
taxes, tax incentives for R&D performance, and free trade regimes to encourage innovation, while
eschewing subsidies for specific technologies and sectors (Kahin and Hill (2013)). As such, a nat-
ural question that follows is whether incumbent’s party affiliation (i.e., Republican vs. Democrat)
alters the patterns of R&D around elections. To address this question, we explore the interactions
between political uncertainty and political regime and examine how such interactions affect firm’s
R&D investment. Consistent with an increase in political uncertainty stimulating firm’s R&D in-
vestment, we find that the increasing pattern in R&D is only present in election years where the
political uncertainty is supposed to be high, but doesn’t exist in post-election years once political
uncertainty is resolved. While incumbent Republican regime is on average associated with more
R&D over the entire sample period, we find little evidence that political regimes affect the R&D
sensitivity to political uncertainty around the election cycle.
There are firm characteristics that should result in firms being particularly sensitive to increases
in political uncertainty. We expect that the election year increase in R&D is more pronounced for
firms operating in politically sensitive industries, because these firms are more likely to face regu-
latory changes that affect their business operations and corporate decisions (Kostovetsky (2009)).
Consistent with the expectation, we find that politically sensitive industries have approximately
a 15.0% increase in R&D intensities in election years, while is figure is only 2.4% for other in-
dustries. These results support the view that firms operating in politically sensitive industries are
particularly sensitive to increases in political uncertainty.
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To better understand the economic mechanisms behind our main results, we further conduct
several cross-sectional tests to exploit settings where the positive effect of political uncertainty
on a firm’s R&D intensity is predictably larger. We first consider rival preemption. The R&D
project’ value will be greatly destroyed when a competitor completes the similar product first,
especially in competitions for patents (e.g., Weeds (2002)). Thus, the positive effect of political
uncertainty on R&D is expected to be especially strong for firms subject to a high level of product
market competition. We then consider growth options, which provide firms the ability to expand
the “upside potential” in the future (e.g., Kulatilaka and Perroti (1998) and Pindyck (1988)). To
the extent that R&D investments generate potential growth options, we expect that under imperfect
competition, firms with higher growth options have stronger incentives to preemptively invest in the
election year R&D in order to maintain and enhance their competitive advantages over competitors
in the future. Also, R&D projects’ high degree of technical uncertainty and long time-to-build may
create valuable call options on investment that outweigh uncertainty’s discouraging effects due to
irreversibility and in turn lead to early investments (e.g., Grossman and Shapiro (1986), Pindyck
(1993), and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)). Building on this intuition, we expect that the election
year increase in R&D is larger for firms operating in hard-to-innovate industries in which R&D
projects’ technical uncertainty tends to be high and the product development cycle is usually long.
Consistent with the theoretical literature predicting that an increase in uncertainty stimulates R&D
investment, we find that the positive relation between political uncertainty about future government
policies and firms’ R&D intensities is strongest in subsamples of firms that: (1) face greater product
market competition, (2) have higher growth options (e.g., high Q and high-tech firms), or (3)
operate in hard-to-innovate industries.
Our study timely contributes to the wide debate over the impact of uncertainty on both the
level and the timing of R&D investment. On the one hand, different theories emphasize different
channels, some pointing to a positive relationship and some to a negative relationship. On the
other hand, existing empirical evidence on this issue is surprisingly little and also mixed, due
9
to the difficulty both of measuring uncertainty and of establishing causality. In this paper, we
revisit the relationship between uncertainty and R&D investment by exploiting the quasi-natural
experiment created by the U.S. gubernatorial elections over the 1976 to 2013 period as a source of
plausible exogenous increase in political uncertainty. Contrary to conventional wisdom drawing on
real options theory, we find novel and causal empirical evidence that political uncertainty indeed
encourages firm R&D investment in election years. This is consistent with a theoretical literature
emphasizing that when investment has strategic value, growth options and strategic preemption
may dominate uncertainty’s depressing effects on R&D and drive the firm to launch R&D projects
earlier in the face of uncertainty. To establish causality, we use term-limited elections in which
incumbents are ineligible for re-elections to test against the alternative political business cycles
hypothesis explaining the changes in R&D investment around elections. We find no evidence that
this hypothesis is operating in our sample of firms.
The paper also increases our understanding of the drivers of corporate innovation. On the in-
novation input side, prior studies have examined how corporate R&D investment is influenced by
a firm’s industry (Scherer (1984) and Beck and Levine (2002)), corporate strategy (Baysinger and
Hoskisson (1989), Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) and Baysinger et al. (1991)), institutional ownership
(Baysinger et al. (1991), Graves (1988) and Hansen and Hill (1991)), internal and external finance
(Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Brown et al. (2009) and Hall and Lerner (2009)), CEO charac-
teristics (Barker and Mueller (2002), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Hirshleifer, Teoh and
Low (2012)), board compositions (Kor (2006)), shareholder protection (John, Litov and Yeung
(2008) and Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2013)), and an active acquisition market (Phillips
and Zhdanov (2013) and Bena and Li (2014)) to name just a few factors. On the innovation out-
put side, existing research has focused on firm- and market-specific factors in determining firm
patenting activity, including incentive compensation for managers (Manso (2011)), institutional
ownership (Aghion et al. (2013)), anti-takeover provisions (Atanassov (2013) and Chemmanur
and Tian (2013)), access to the equity market (Gao et al. (2014) and Hsu et al. (2014)), firms’
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information environment (He and Tian (2013)), banking competition (Cornaggia et al. (2015)),
investors’ tolerance (Tian and Wang (2014)), stock liquidity (Fang et al. (2014)), ownership struc-
tures (Ferreira, Manso and Silva (2014)), and debt covenant violations (Gu et al. (2014)), among
others. Although these studies enhance the understanding of the mechanisms that motivate firms to
innovate, the role of politics, especially political uncertainty, is largely overlooked. In this paper,
we identify a new determinant of corporate innovation and provide casual evidence that political
uncertainty created by elections has a significant and positive effect on corporate R&D investmen-
t policy, supporting the view that strategic preemption and growth options motive is particularly
important.
Lastly, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature on the role of politics, especially
political uncertainty, in shaping firm performance and corporate decisions. From the perspective
of asset pricing, Boutchkova et al. (2012), Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013), Belo et al. (2013)
and Brogaard and Detzel (2015) study the impact of political uncertainty on stock returns. From
the perspective of corporate finance, Julio and Yook (2012) show that firms tend to reduce invest-
ment prior to national elections around the world, due to the rising political uncertainty related to
elections. Similar findings have been documented for U.S. public firms around U.S. gubernatorial
elections by Jens (2013). Using U.S. gubernatorial election data, Gao and Qi (2013), Liu and Ngo
(2013), Colak et al. (2014), and Dai and Ngo (2014) further investigate the impact of political
uncertainty on the financing costs of public debts, bank failure rate, IPO activity, and accounting
conservatism respectively. As far as we know, we are the first to relate firm-level R&D dynamics
to political uncertainty created by U.S. gubernatorial elections. While recent research largely sug-
gests that political uncertainty about government policies has negative real and financial effects,
we document the bright side of political uncertainty in that it indeed encourages R&D investment
in innovative growth options.
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2. Data
The primary source for the U.S. gubernatorial election data is the CQ Press Electronic Library.
Firm-specific accounting variables are obtained from Compustat database. Our initial sample con-
tains all domestic firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets. Since we analyze the
relation between political uncertainty and firm R&D investment, we also include in the analysis
all the over-the-counter (OTC) traded domestic firms, which tend to be small technology stocks
and deserve close examination.6 Our sample period runs from 1976 to 2013 as the accounting
treatment of R&D expense reporting was not standardized by FASB until 1975 (e.g., Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board Statement No. 2), as also noted in Li (2011). We focus on annual R&D
expenditure since quarterly R&D data are generally unavailable until 1989.7 The sample only in-
cludes firm-year combinations with non-missing R&D expense and positive total assets.8 We omit
firms not headquartered in any of the 48 U.S. states and firms with missing data for the main vari-
ables used in the analysis.9 Further, observations with book assets less than $5 million (inflation
adjusted to 2013) are excluded. We combine accounting data from the Compustat database and the
U.S. gubernatorial election data by election year and firm headquarter state. There is a potential
issue with this approach in that Compustat only reports the current state of a firm’s headquarters,
6OTC traded firms account for roughly 30% of the firm-year combinations in our final sample and on average
have significantly higher R&D intensities (measured by R&D expenses as a percentage of total assets) than those of
exchange traded firms. For example, the mean value of R&D intensity is 0.0968 for OTC traded firms, while this
figure is only 0.0780 for exchange traded firms (the difference is significant at the 1% level). In the robustness tests,
we show that the exclusion of OTC traded firms do not alter our results.
7We note that quarterly R&D has a strong cyclical trend based on the firm’s financial year. Although we focus
on annual R&D expense data in the main tests, in unreported analysis, we show that our results are robust to using
quarterly R&D expense data. Results are available upon request.
8R&D expense may be subject to measurement biases from missing value in the Compustat database. Chemmanur
and Tian (2013) report that about 50% of Compustat firms do not report R&D expenses in their financial statements
(partly due to firms not reporting R&D spending when it is trivial). Koh and Reeb (2015) empirically document that
missing R&D does not necessarily imply that these firms have no substantive R&D activities. Therefore, in the main
tests, we only use firm-year observations with non-missing R&D expense. In unreported analysis, we show that our
baseline results still hold after replacing missing values of R&D expense with zero, which is a conventional approach
in the existing literature (e.g., Bound et al. (1984), Brown and Petersen (2011) and Hirschey et al. (2012)). Results
are available upon request.
9Howells (1990) and Breschi (2008) show that firms usually locate their R&D facilities close to headquarters and
do not disperse them geographically. In addition, two states, New Hampshire (NH) and Vermont (VT), are excluded
in the analysis as they follow a two-year gubernatorial term throughout the sample period.
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not its historical headquarters, which introduces measurement error if the firm has relocated. Nev-
ertheless, the number of firms that relocate is on average small and should introduce only a small
amount of noise to our results.10 Finally, we collect information on state macroeconomic condi-
tions such as annual GDP growth rate and unemployment rate from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). By applying these selection criteria, We end up with a sample of 90,637 firm-year
observations between 1976 and 2013. Our overall sample ensures that we have a representative
sample for a large cross-section of firms over a long time horizon. Below, We describe main vari-
ables, sample selection and data collection procedures. Appendix A provides detailed information
on definitions, construction, and data sources of variables.
2.1. Gubernatorial Elections
The timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections is exogenously determined by law. Every state
but Louisiana holds its gubernatorial election on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in
November.11 Currently, the vast majority of the states hold gubernatorial elections every four
years, with the exception of Vermont and New Hampshire, which choose to run their gubernatorial
elections every two years. Five states, including Louisiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, and
Virginia, elect their state governors in odd-numbered years just preceding a presidential election.
Other states run their gubernatorial elections in even-numbered years to coincide either mid-term
elections or presidential elections. In thirty-eight states, governors are limited to two consecutive
terms. In some cases, states have changed the length of their gubernatorial election cycle. For
10For example, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find only 118 examples of relocation in a sample of more than 5,000
firms over 15 years. Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) identify that only 4% of firms’ headquarter states are misrecorded
in Compustat for fiscal year 2011. In the robustness tests, we show that our results are robust to using an alternative
measure of firm’s headquarter state location based on Garcia and Norli (2012)’s dataset on the state-level operations
of individual firms.
11The election timing of Louisiana may differ every year due to the adoption of the open primary system, where all
the candidates for an office run together in one election. See Wikipedia for more detailed discussion about elections
in Louisiana: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Louisiana
13
example, the state of Arizona and the state of Rhode Island switched from a two-year election
cycle to a four-year election cycle in 1986 and 1994 respectively.12
We use U.S. gubernatorial elections as the main proxy for the measures of political uncertainty.
We focus on gubernatorial elections in the baseline analysis, instead of the presidential elections
or the economic policy uncertainty index developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) for several
reasons. First, gubernatorial elections are pre-scheduled and thus can be viewed as mostly exoge-
nous events where political uncertainty arises. Using such a setting mitigates possible endogeneity
between political uncertainty and general economic conditions, which may also affect corporate
R&D decisions, and allows us to make causal inferences regarding the real impact of political
uncertainty on R&D investment. Second, unlike presidential elections, gubernatorial elections in
different states occur in different years. Therefore, substantial across- and within-state variations
exist in addition to the time series variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections. For example,
there are total 437 gubernatorial elections conducted in 48 states during the sample period of 1976
to 2013.13 In contrast, there are only 10 president elections during the same period, which is not
an adequate sample to yield any meaningful statistical inferences. On the other hand, as a country
level index, there is little cross-sectional variation in the economic policy uncertainty index by
construction. Besides, the index itself may not be purely exogenous in the sense that firm R&D
investment behavior could also impact news coverage, government policy and economic forecasts,
which constitute the key underlying components of the index. 14 This said, gubernatorial elections,
as mostly exogenous events, are less subject to measurement biases resulting from survey sampling
or model estimation inherited in the construction of the economic policy uncertainty index.
12The only special election in the sample period took place in California in 2003. It resulted in voters replacing
incumbent Democratic Governor Gray Davis with Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger. We treat this observation as
all other election observations, and its inclusion has no effect on the results.
13Since we are interested in analyzing the change in R&D dynamics in both election and post-election years, we
exclude New Hampshire and Vermont in the analysis, which follow a two-year gubernatorial term.
14See Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) for more detailed discussion on the construction of the the economic policy
uncertainty index: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/methodology.html
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Our study considers 437 gubernatorial elections in 48 states held between 1976 and 2013.
Detailed election information is obtained from a variety of sources. The primary source for election
and regime change data is the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection, which is part of the
CQ Press Electronic Library.15 This database contains information on election date, the names
of Republican/Democract candidates and the independent candidates (if any), incumbent party
affiliation, whether the incumbent governors seek re-election, whether the incumbents are subject
to term limit expiration, other reasons if the incumbents don’t participate in the election (e.g.,
defeated in primary or retired or simply not running for re-election), the winning candidate/party
affiliation, the percentage vote for each candidate and the vote margin of the election. We further
supplement the gubernatorial election data with Wikipedia for cases in which election information
is missing from the CQ Electronic Library.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes our gubernatorial election data for the sample period from 1976
to 2013. There are 437 gubernatorial elections in total, distributed quite evenly across the 48 U.S.
states. As discussed earlier, the distribution of elections offers a great deal of both cross-sectional
and time-series variations to test their effects on firm R&D policies. Following the identification
of Julio and Yook (2012) and Jens (2013), we classify an election as being more uncertain if it is
a close election, where the victory margin, defined as the percentage vote difference between the
first place candidate and the second place candidate, is less than 5%. We also distinguish elections
where incumbents are eligible for re-elections and elections where incumbents face term limits.
We expect elections where incumbents face term limits to be more uncertain. Further discussion
on the appropriateness of the measures of the degree of electoral uncertainty is provided in §3.2.
Of the 437 elections, 99 are defined as close. The average close election has a vote differential of
2.4%. In 120 elections, incumbent governors do not seek re-election due to term-limit expirations.
15The CQ Press Electronic Library database is available at http://library.cqpress.com/elections/
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Further, close elections are 50% more likely than non-close elections to be term limited elections
(38.4% vs. 24.3%).
2.2. Firm and State Variables
We obtain firm characteristics data from Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual files
for the period from 1976 to 2013. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (since 1972) and
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (since 1974) has required all material R&D expenses
to be disclosed on the firm’s financial statements. On the Compustat database, R&D expenses
represent all costs incurred during the financial year that relate to the development of new products
or services. In this paper, the main variable of interest is R&D intensity, measured as the ratio
of firm’s R&D expense to its total assets. To isolate the effect of political uncertainty and firm
R&D policies, we control for a set of firm characteristics that are likely to correlate with firm’s
R&D policies following Atanassov (2013) among others: Market-to-book (Q) is the market value
of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity and deferred taxes, divided by
total assets; Cash Flow is measured by income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and
amortization, scaled by total assets; Profitability is the EBITDA-to-assets ratio; Tangibility is the
net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) divided by total assets; Leverage is the book value
of debt divided by total assets.16 These definitions are standard in the literature. Profitability
and Q are included to capture firms’ operating profitabilities and growth opportunities. Cash flow
and leverage ratio are added to control for the possible effects of internal financing and capital
structure decisions on R&D intensity. In the empirical specification, we also follow Hall and
Ziedonis (2001) and include Ln(Sales) to control for firm size. Following Aghion et al. (2005), we
control for industry concentration using the Herfindahl index calculated at the 3-digit SIC level.
we also use the squared Herfindahl index, Her f indahl2, to control for possible nonlinear effects
16Throughout the analysis, we use contemporaneous total assets to normalize firm characteristics variables. How-
ever, we obtain quantitatively and qualitatively similar results using lagged total assets as the alternative scaling factor.
Results are unreported for brevity and are available from the authors upon request.
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of industry concentration. We construct the firm age, Ln(Age), that measures the age of the firm as
the number of years that it appears in the Compustat database.
State-level variables are also included in the analysis to account for the general economic con-
ditions within a state: the annual change in state GDP and annual state unemployment rate, both
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website.17 The sample period is from 1976
to 2013, which is chosen to match the availability of annual R&D expense data in Compustat
database. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove the
influence of extreme outliers.18 Appendix A provides detailed variable descriptions as well as the
variable sources.
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the main firm and state variables used in
the regression analyses. The mean (median) firm has a R&D-to-assets ratio of 8.3% (3.2%), which
is slightly lower than that reported in Brown et al. (2009), as their sample only consists of R&D
intensive firms operating in the high-tech sectors. In addition, an average firm in our sample has
a Q of 1.9, a cash flow of -3.5%, a ln(age) of 2.3 years, a ln(sales) of $4.5 million, a profitability
of 2.3%, a tangibility of 23.2%, a leverage ratio of 21.5% and a Herfindahl concentration index of
25.3%. The reported firm characteristics are typical of Compustat public firms and are generally
comparable to previous studies (e.g., Atanassov (2013) and Cornaggia et al. (2015)).19 The last
two columns in Panel B of Table 1 also reports some summary statistics on the state-level macroe-
conomics. For example, the average annual GDP growth rate is 6.2% and average unemployment
rate is 6.3% respectively.
17BEA website is available at http://www.bea.gov/
18The results are robust to alternatively winsorizing firm characteristics at the 5th and 95th percentiles.
19We note that the negative cash flow and the low profitability is driven by the OTC firms, which account for roughly
30% of the firm-year observations in our final sample. The average cash flow and profitability are negative (positive)
for OTC (exchange) traded firms. Specifically, for OTC traded firms, the mean of inflation adjusted (to 2013) firm size
is $181.4 million, the mean of R&D-to-assets ratio is 9.7%, the mean of Q is 2.0, the mean of cash flow is -16.9%,
the mean of ln(age) is 2.0 years, the mean of ln(sales) is $3.1 million, the mean of tangibility is 22.8%, the mean of
profitability is -9.6% and the mean of leverage is 27.7%. For exchange traded firms, the mean of inflation adjusted (to
2013) firm size is $2010.2 million, the mean of R&D-to-assets ratio is 7.8%, the mean of Q is 1.9, the mean of cash
flow is 1.7%, the mean of ln(age) is 2.4 years, the mean of ln(sales) is $5.1 million, the mean of tangibility is 23.4%,
the mean of profitability is 6.9% and the mean of leverage is 19.1%.
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3. Empirical Results
This section presents our empirical findings related to changes in R&D intensity around guber-
natorial election cycles. We begin with the univariate analysis, followed by a multiple regression
framework controlling for firm characteristics and state economic conditions. To better understand
the economic channels through which political uncertainty affects R&D policy, we further ex-
ploit variation in the sensitivity of R&D intensity to political uncertainty across elections, political
regimes, industries, and firms. We then perform a number of additional tests to ensure that our
baseline results are robust to various subsamples and alternative model specifications. Finally, we
examine changes in firm innovation performance (proxied by patenting activities) in post-election
years.
3.1. R&D Intensity around Gubernatorial Elections
Panel C of Table 1 summarize the mean R&D intensity around gubernatorial elections. We
first note that in non-election years, the unconditional average R&D intensity, measured by R&D
expenses as a percentage of total assets, is 0.0827. The R&D-to-assets ratio increases by 0.0023 to
0.0850 in election years. The increase, statistically significant at the 5% level, represents a 2.8%
upsurge in the unconditional mean R&D intensity relative to non-election years in the overall sam-
ple of firms. Panel D provides a more detailed examination of corporate R&D dynamics across the
gubernatorial election cycle. The annual mean R&D intensity before and after the election year
are reported, with year 0 indicating the election year. The non-election years show no significant
pattern in R&D, aside from a small reduction in year 1, the year immediately following the elec-
tion. Similar to the results in Panel C, the mean R&D intensity in election years is significantly
higher than that in nonelection years. Later in this section, we investigate the post-election R&D
patterns in more detail. Although the univariate evidence appears to support the view that electoral
uncertainty leads to a temporary upsurge in corporate R&D investment, these unconditional rela-
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tions should be interpreted with caution since the effects of firm and state variables are not taken
into consideration.
We next investigate corporate R&D policy in a multivariate setting to control for firm char-
acteristics and state economic conditions. We employ a standard difference-in-difference (DD)
framework to evaluate changes in corporate R&D intensity across gubernatorial election cycles
that cannot be explained by other explanatory variables. The main regression model is specified as
follows:
R&D Intensityi jt = αi + γt +β0×Election Dummy j,t +∑ϕiXi+∑δjSjt+ εi jt (1)
where i indexes firms, j indexes states, and t indexes years. The dependent variable is the firm-
level R&D intensity, measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. The main variable
of interest is the election dummy, Election j,t , which takes on a value of one if a gubernatorial elec-
tion occurred in state j in year t. The above DD model uses firms in states without an upcoming
election as the control group for a treated sample of firms in states about to elect a governor. The
coefficient estimate on the election dummy, β0, is thus designed to capture changes in R&D inten-
sity in election years between the treated and control samples. To control for firm characteristics
and state economic conditions, we include a set of control variables motivated by Aghion et al.
(2005) and Atanassov (2013), who identify potential determinants of R&D investment, both in the
cross-section and over time. Xi is a vector of firm characteristics, which include Q, Cash flow,
Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility, Profitability, Leverage, Herfindahl, Herfindahl2. Sjt is a vector of
state macroeconomic variables, including annual state GDP growth rate and state unemployment
rate. Appendix A provides details on variable descriptions as well as variable sources. In addition,
we include both firm and year fixed effects in the baseline R&D regression to account for any time-
invariant unobservable variation. This specification captures the within-firm variation in corporate
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R&D intensity around gubernatorial election event years. Following Petersen (2009), we compute
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered by firm in all specifications.20
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 summarizes the results for our baseline R&D regression specification. The first column
reports the regression of R&D intensity on the election dummy alone, without firm and year fixed
effects. In columns (2) to (8), we sequentially include firm and year fixed effects and additional
variables describing firm characteristics and state macroeconomic conditions. The coefficient esti-
mates on the election year dummy are positive and statistically significant across all specifications,
suggesting that political uncertainty stimulates firm R&D spending in election years. Depending
on the specification, the increases in conditional R&D intensity range between 0.0036 to 0.0047.
The estimates reported in column (8), which represent the baseline specification throughout the
rest of analysis, show that R&D intensities increase by 0.0038 on average in election years, after
controlling for firm and state variables. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient estimate translates
into an economically significant 4.6% (=0.0038/0.0827*100%) increase in firms’ R&D-to-assets
ratio in election years, relative to the average R&D intensity in non-election years. Table 2 also
shows that the signs on the estimated coefficients on the control variables are mostly consistent
with previous findings in the literature, except cash flow variable.21 R&D intensity is positive-
ly related to Q and firm age, sales, tangibility, GDP growth and unemployment, but negatively
related to cash flow, profitability and book leverage. Other control variables are generally not re-
20This specification is the most appropriate in a panel with a large cross-section of firms but a small number of
periods (Petersen (2009)). For robustness, we repeat our analysis with standard errors clustered at both firm and year
levels and find slightly weaker but still significant results.
21Unlike Brown et al. (2009), we find that cash flow has a negative effect on R&D intensity. Recall that the negative
cash flow firms account for roughly 30% of the firm-year observations in our final sample. While (in unreported tests)
we show that cash flow is positively (negatively) associated with R&D intensity for the subsample of positive (negative)
cash flow firms, the overall effect is dominated by the negative cash flow firms in the full sample, as also noted in the
summary statistics in Panel B of Table 1. Our findings are thus consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature
predicting a U-shaped relationship between cash flow and capital investment (e.g., Cleary et al. (2007)): investment
increases monotonically with internal funds if they are large but decreases if they are very low. In unreported analysis,
we are able to replicate the coefficient estimates on cash flow reported in Brown et al. (2009) if we use their cash flow
definition ((IB+DP+XRD)/AT), sample selection and estimation strategy.
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lated. Overall, the results from the baseline specification show that political uncertainty associated
with gubernatorial elections creates a positive impact on firms’ R&D spending, which is consistent
with a theoretical literature emphasizing that the positive “preemption/growth” effect outweighs
the negative “option” effect of uncertainty on R&D spending in a competing setting.
For the reminder of the paper, we only indicate which control variables are included in the
regression specifications but may not report the coefficient estimates to preserve space. However,
the coefficient estimates for the control variables remain largely unchanged for our various speci-
fications.
3.2. Degree of Electoral Uncertainty and R&D Intensity
We have so far established the fact that R&D intensity is systematically higher in election years
in the overall sample, which supports the hypothesis that when facing political uncertainty created
by elections, firms tend to increase R&D spending in the fear of competitive preemption. In order
to cross-validate the main hypothesis and deepen the understanding of political uncertainty, we
further exploit variation in the degree of political uncertainty and their likely economic impact
across states and over time. The impact of electoral uncertainty on R&D intensity should depend
on both the predictability of an election’s outcomes and the probability that a policy shift will
occur. Highly unpredictable elections introduce exogenous shocks and are considered as better
proxies for political uncertainty. (e.g., Snowberg et al. (2007)). Motivated by these arguments, we
expect that the stimulating effects of political uncertainty on firm R&D spending should be more
pronounced in elections characterized by higher levels of electoral uncertainty. We examine these
predictions in this subsection.
We consider two empirical measures that capture the degree of electoral uncertainty. The first
measure is the the victory margin, defined as the percentage vote differences between the first
place candidate and the second place candidate. The idea is that closer elections, indicated by
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smaller victory margins, entail more uncertainty about the eventual winner and future government
policy and therefore can be associated with higher levels of political uncertainty, which should
cause a greater increase in election year R&D spending. To incorporate differences in the degree
of electoral uncertainty, we create an indicator variable, close election, which is set to one if the
victory margin is less than 5% and zero otherwise. It is an ex post measure of how close the
election was, but should capture the ex-ante uncertainty levels of election outcomes well. Of the
437 elections covered in my analysis, 99 (approximately 23%) are identified as close elections.
This metric has been used extensively in the literature. For example, Julio and Yook (2012) and
Jens (2013) use this measure to analyze changes in corporate investment around close elections.
The second measure considers elections in which incumbent governors are not eligible for re-
elections due to term-limit expirations. Previous studies extensively document that the advantage
of incumbency is an important predictor of any executive or legislative elections’ outcomes (e.g.,
Cover (1977), Gelman and King (1990) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002)). Consistent with
this argument, we find that incumbents in our sample win more than 80% of the gubernatorial races
when they run for re-elections. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that if an incumbent governor is
not a candidate on the election ballot due to term limit, the electoral uncertainty and competition
surrounding the election are likely to be high. To capture the variation in incumbency advantage,
we define an indicator variable, term limit, which is set to one if incumbents face term limit expi-
rations and zero otherwise. We identify 120 gubernatorial elections (approximately 27%) with the
indicator variable equal to one.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 reports the results of the R&D regression with an interaction term between the election
dummy and our measures of electoral uncertainty. In columns (1) and (2), we perform subsample
analysis by splitting the full sample into two groups according to election closeness.22 While the
22Please note that non-election years are included in in the subsample analysis as a benchmark group.
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positive political uncertainty–R&D intensity relation is present for both close election and non-
close election subsamples, the larger coefficient estimate in the close election subsample analysis
implies a much stronger effect of political uncertainty on R&D spending in close elections (7.0%
vs. 3.4%). To directly assess the effects of higher political uncertainty caused by close elections
on firm R&D spending in election years, in column (3) of Table 3, we follow Julio and Yook
(2012) and add to our baseline regression an interaction term between election dummy and close
election dummy. As indicated in column (3), the interaction term is large, positive and statistically
significant, consistent with the hypothesis that the magnitude of R&D spending is increasing in
the degree of electoral uncertainty surrounding the election. In economic terms, the coefficient
estimate on the interaction term implies that the average R&D intensities increase by almost 7.3%
((0.0029+0.0031)/0.0827*100%) in hotly contested elections. Columns (4) to (6) replicate the
analysis in the first three columns but using term limit to proxy for electoral uncertainty. We find
similar results.
Overall, we find that the positive effect of political uncertainty on R&D intensity is mainly
driven by hotly contested elections in which the electoral uncertainty and competition are likely
to be higher. Although our main identification strategies are less vulnerable to potential reverse
causality, the findings in this subsection help strengthen the causality that indeed runs from political
uncertainty to R&D investment, further confirming the main hypothesis.
3.3. Republican vs. Democrat
Prior studies document that financial markets behave differently under different political regimes
(i.e., Republican vs. Democrat).23 A natural question that follows is whether the incumbent’s party
23For example, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Alesina et al. (1997) show that on average, annual GDP is
higher under Democratic term. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that excess stock returns are higher and real
interest rates are lower under Democratic than Republican presidencies after controlling for business-cycle variables
and risk factors. Belo et al. (2013) report that during Democratic presidencies, firms with high government exposure
experience higher cash flows and stock returns, and that the opposite is true during Republican presidencies. In a
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affiliation alters the pattern of R&D spending around elections. To address this question, we create
a regime dummy variable to indicate whether the incumbent governor is a Republican or not. The
party identification of the governor is the party of the governor who held office for the majority of
the year. Since gubernatorial elections usually take place at the beginning of November followed
by inaugurations of the new governors in the following January or February, the party of the elec-
tion year will be the party of the incumbent, while the party of the following year will be the newly
elected governor’s party. To provide a more detailed estimation of the impact of political regime
on the R&D sensitivity to political uncertainty around the full election cycle, we further add to
our baseline R&D regression model a post-election year dummy, which is set equal to one for the
year immediately following the election year. We also interact this post-election dummy with the
regime indicator in the regression analysis.
To investigate the role of political regime, we follow Julio and Yook (2012) and estimate an
augmented version of the baseline R&D regression model:
R&D Intensityi jt = αi + γt +β0×Election j,t +β1×Election j,t ×Regime j,t (2)
+β2×Post-election j,t+1 +β3×Post-election j,t+1×Regime j,t
+β4×Regime j,t +∑ϕiXi+∑δjSjt+ εi jt
where Regime j,t is an indicator variable set equal to one if the party affiliation of the incumbent
governor of state j in year t is Republican and zero if it is Democrat. The timing of the two
election dummy variables is set to capture the firms’ R&D dynamics around the full election cycle.
The coefficient estimates of the interaction terms, β1 and β3, should pick up the added effects of
Republican regime on the magnitude of R&D sensitivity to political uncertainty in election years
and post-election years respectively. The coefficient estimate on the regime indicator variable β4
recent study, Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) further show that Democratic-leaning firms are more socially responsible
than Republican-leaning firms.
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alone should capture the underlying difference in R&D spending between Republican regime and
Democrat regime over the entire sample period.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results. In columns (1) to (3), we estimate this specifica-
tion on the full sample, the Republican subsample (Regime j,t = 1) and the Democratic subsample
(Regime j,t = 0) without including interaction terms. In column (4), we interact the regime indi-
cator with the two election timing dummies in the full sample to directly assess the the role of
political regime. Across all specifications in Table 4, we find that the election dummy remains
positive and statistically significant, while the post-election dummy is insignificant. These results
indicate that while firm R&D spending surges in election years due to the increase in political un-
certainty created by elections, it shows no discernible pattern in post-election years when political
uncertainty is resolved. Further, column (4) reports a positive and significant coefficient estimate
on the regime indicator, implying that on average firms tend to invest more in R&D under Re-
publican regime over the full sample period. However, the interaction terms are not significant,
suggesting there is no difference in R&D spending between Republican regime and Democratic
regime around the election cycle.
In the final two rows of Table 4, we also include for all specifications a test of whether the net
change in R&D around the election cycle is significantly different from zero. This is simply a test
of whether the sum of the coefficients on the election timing dummies (and the interaction terms)
are zero. The table shows that the political uncertainty induced R&D cycles are present across
different political regimes and represent a net increase in R&D spending around the elections.
Overall, we find little evidence that political regimes affect the R&D sensitivity to political
uncertainty around the election cycle, although the two parties in the U.S. political systems have
different agendas about their R&D and innovation policies.24
24As noted in Kahin and Hill (2013), Democrats tend to engage in specific, identifiable national goals, such as
safe and clean energy, exploring and learning about space, or wiring the nation. They are also willing to create new
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3.4. Politically Sensitive Industries
To better understand the economic channels through which political uncertainty induced by up-
coming gubernatorial elections affects firm R&D policies, we exploit variations in the sensitivity
of R&D intensity to political uncertainty across industry and firm characteristics. In this subsec-
tion, we first examine whether politically sensitive industries exacerbate or attenuate the positive
impact of political uncertainty on firm R&D spending around the election cycle.
Firms are likely to differ from each other with respect to their sensitivity to political uncer-
tainty. For example, both Julio and Yook (2012) and Jens (2013) find that the adverse effect of
political uncertainty on firm investment is stronger in politically sensitive industries. Boutchkova
et al. (2012) document that equity return volatility is higher around elections in politically sensitive
industries. We thus expect that the election year increase in R&D should be more pronounced for
firms operating in politically sensitive industries, because these firms are more likely to face regu-
latory changes that affect their business operations and corporate decisions (Kostovetsky (2009)).
Following the identification of Herron et al. (1999), we classify firms operating in tobacco product-
s, pharmaceuticals, health care services, defense, petroleum and natural gas, telecommunications,
and transportation industries as politically sensitive, where Fama French 48 industries is used as
the industry classification. We then set a sensitive industry dummy to one if a firm belongs to one
of these politically sensitive industries.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
To test the hypothesis, we perform subsample analyses for firms operating in politically sen-
sitive industries and those in non-sensitive industries separately. We also interact the sensitive in-
dustry dummy with the election year dummy in the baseline R&D regression to directly compare
programs that provide targeted resources to the private sector to directly subsidize early-stage commercial innovation.
In contrast, Republicans prefer to create the general conditions for, and incentives to encourage, innovation in many
areas. For example, they prefer low corporate taxes, tax incentives for R&D performance, and free trade regimes to
encourage innovation, while eschewing subsidies for specific technologies and sectors.
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the two types of industries. Table 5 reports the estimation results from this analysis. Consistent
with the expectation, estimates in columns (1) and (2) indicate that politically sensitive industries
experience a 15.0% increase in R&D intensity in election years, while this figure is only 2.4% for
non-sensitive industries. Overall, the results support the view that firms operating in politically
sensitive industries are particularly sensitive to the increases in political uncertainty created by
upcoming election.
3.5. Product Market Competition
The positive effect of political uncertainty on firm R&D spending is also affected by a firm’s
competitive environment. A key feature of R&D investments is that they cannot be held inde-
pendently of strategic considerations. To the extent that strategic rivalry introduces the threat of
preemption, a firm fears that a competitor may seize an advantage by acting first. For example,
Weeds (2002) considers a real options model with R&D competition and finds that uncertainty
may indeed encourage firm R&D investments when the expected value of strategic preemption
outweighs the option value of waiting. Based on their findings, we conjecture that product market
competition may further amplify the positive effect of political uncertainty on firm R&D spending
in election years. In this subsection, we empirically test this hypothesis.
We examine two types of product market competition measures for our tests. The first mea-
sure is the Herfindahl Index (HHI). The industry-level measure is calculated as HHI = ∑Ni=1 S2i ,
where Si is the market share of firm i’s sales within a 3-digit SIC industry and the summation is
performed over the total number of N firms in that industry.25 By construction, HHI measures
the degree of product market concentration and a lower product market concentration indicates
higher competition and vice versa (Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007)). Since HHI is at the
25HHI is calculated based on 3-digit SICs for the reported results. When alternatively classifying industries using
2-digit SICs, Fama and French (1997) 48-industries, or Hoberg and Phillips (2010) FIC-300 industries, we obtain
similar results.
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industry level and may not closely capture the dynamic interactions between competitors, we also
consider the product market fluidity measure in our second test. The firm level measure, fluidi-
ty, is a text-based measure of product market threats developed in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala
(2014), which captures firm’s product similarity from its rivals. The fluidity data is obtained from
the Hoberg-Phillips data library and covers a large sample of U.S. public firms for the period from
1997 to 2011.26 For our purpose, product market fluidity is a suitable proxy for product market
competition and a higher fluidity reflects a greater product market threats from rivals.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
To test the hypothesis, we separately estimate the impact of political uncertainty on R&D
spending for firms with above and below sample median HHI and product market fluidity each
year. We also interact each competition measure with the election year dummy to directly assess
the role of product market competition. The first three columns of Table 6 present the estimation
results based on the HHI measure, while the last three columns replicate the analysis using product
market fluidity measure. For both measures, the results are consistent with our conjecture and show
that product market competition amplifies the positive effect of political uncertainty on firm R&D
spending in election years. For example, based on the product market fluidity measure, coefficient
estimates reported in columns (4) and (5) indicate that for firms operating in high competitive
environments (high fluidity), the election year increase in R&D is 10.4%, compared to 2.2% for
firms in low competitive environments (low fluidity). Overall, the results in Table 6 confirm that
the election year increase in R&D is much larger for firms facing more competitive pressure in the
product markets, due to the threat of preemption induced by strategic competition.
26We would like to thank Jerry Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for generously providing this data on their website:
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/.
28
3.6. Growth Opportunities
The R&D sensitivity to electoral uncertainty should also depend on firms’ growth opportuni-
ties. For example, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) develop a strategic growth option model and the-
oretically predict that under imperfect competition, increased uncertainty may actually encourage
firm investment in growth options. Prior literature documents that firms can reap growth oppor-
tunities from investing in R&D projects, because R&D activities lead to either new products or
more efficient production processes, which enable the firms to either open a new market or reduce
production costs, and hence to gain larger market shares and make more profits. To the extent that
R&D investments generate potential growth options, we conjecture that under political uncertain-
ty, firms with higher growth opportunities have stronger incentives to invest in R&D in order to
maintain or enhance their competitive advantages over competitors in the future.
To test the hypothesis, we draw from the literature and use firm-specific Q and high-tech in-
dustry to proxy for firms’ growth opportunities. Q represents the divergence between the market
value and book value of firms’ capital stock. The basic idea is that firms with abundant growth
opportunities have relatively high market value compared to their physical assets and thus tend to
have high Q. This metric has been used extensively in the literature as an indicator of firm-level
growth opportunities. For example, Lang and Stulz (1994) show that diversified firms have a lower
Q ratio than focused firms because the market penalizes the value of the diversified firm assets.
Cao et al. (2008) use this measure to gauge firm growth options and find that the long-term trend
in idiosyncratic risk vanishes after controlling for growth options. Further, Kogan and Papaniko-
laou (2010) empirically document that Q is a good proxy for growth opportunities. High Q is an
indicator variable set equal to one for firms with above industry median Q each year.
High-tech firms account for the overwhelming share of R&D activity (Hirschey et al. (2012)).
The contribution of these firms to technological progress through R&D and innovation has been
found to be crucial (Acs and Audretsch (1990)). High-tech firms as opposed to non high-tech
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firms are supposed to have more growth options and in turn should be more affected by political
uncertainty. To test the hypothesis, we follow Brown et al. (2009) and classify firms operating in
drugs (283), office equipment and computers (357), communication equipment (366), electronic
components (367), scientific instruments (382), medical instruments (384), and software (737) as
high-tech firms, where the classification is based on 3-digit SIC codes. We set a high-tech industry
dummy variable to one if a firm belongs to one of these seven high-tech industries.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
To assess the role of growth options, we split the full sample into high vs. low growth subgroups
based on median Q each year or the high-tech industry indicator, and re-estimate the baseline R&D
model on each subgroup separately. We also interact each growth options proxy with the election
dummy directly. Table 7 presents the estimation results from this analysis. Each column is based on
such a growth options proxy, indicated by the column heading. As we intuitively expect, the results
show that the election year increase in firm R&D spending is mainly driven by the subsample of
firms with high growth options. For example, when median Q as the proxy for growth options,
estimates in columns (1) and (2) indicate that high growth firms (high Q subgroup) increase R&D
intensities by 4.9% in election years, however this figure is only 3.1% for low growth firms (low
Q subgroup). The interaction term between the high Q dummy and the election dummy in column
(3) has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.0021, representing an additional 2.5% increase
in R&D for high growth firms, relative to low growth ones. In addition, we notice that the high
Q indicator alone is large, positive and statistically significant, suggesting that high growth firms
on average exhibit higher R&D intensities. This is consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2012) among
others, who report that high growth firms tend to undertake more R&D projects. The last three
columns of Table 7 use high-tech industry as the proxy for growth options and deliver similar
results. For example, the coefficient estimates reported in columns (4) and (5) translate into a 8.5%
(1.2%) increase in election year R&D intensities for high-tech (non high-tech) firms, relative to the
average sample mean R&D intensity.
30
Overall, the results are consistent with a theoretical literature emphasizing that when invest-
ment has strategic value, growth options may dominate uncertainty’s depressing effects and drive
the firm to launch R&D project earlier (e.g., Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998)). The results are also
consistent with the empirical evidence in Driver, Temple and Urga (2008). They document that
industries with high R&D intensity (e.g., high-tech firms and high growth firms) tend to indicate a
positive effect of uncertainty on investment.
3.7. Hard-to-Innovate Firms
In this subsection, we continue to test alternative mechanisms that can shed light on the inter-
pretation of our main findings by performing subsample analyses.
We explore the idea of hard-to-innovate industries in which the R&D processes are character-
ized by long time-to-build and high degree of technical uncertainty. Grossman and Shapiro (1986)
show that firms prefer investment projects with less certain effort required to reach a payoff, and
Pindyck (1993) confirms that R&D projects’ technical uncertainty (i.e., the difficulty of complet-
ing a project) may actually promote firm R&D investment.27 Further, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)
show numerically that if firms have long delays in completing projects, for example due to time-to-
build, then uncertainty may have a positive impact on investment, if it expands the upside of future
outcomes. The basic idea is that R&D projects’ high degree of technical uncertainty and long in-
vestment lags between project inception and completion cannot be reduced simply by postponing
investment, unlike uncertainties related to purely exogenous factors such as the input costs of raw
materials. High levels of technical uncertainty and long investment lags thus create competitive
pressure for firms to invest earlier. Building on these theoretical predictions, we expect to observe
27In Pindyck (1993), technical uncertainty is resolved only for R&D active firms, leading firms to invest sooner
in an uncertain environment. A numerical experiment further leads Pindyck (1993) to conclude that “Thus for many
investments, and particularly for large industrial projects where input costs fluctuate, increasing uncertainty is like-
ly to depress investment. The opposite will be the case only for investments like R&D programs, where technical
uncertainty is far more important.”
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a much stronger impact of political uncertainty on firm R&D spending in these hard-to-innovate
industries, where the R&D processes are typically long, very costly and highly uncertain (e.g.,
Holmstrom (1989) and Hall and Lerner (2009)).
Following the work of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang (2014), we clas-
sify firms in pharmaceuticals, medical instrumentation, chemicals, computers, communications,
and electrical industries as hard-to-innovate. while easy-to-innovate industries include software
programming, internet applications and other miscellaneous industries. We set a hard-to-innovate
industry dummy to one if a firm belongs to one of these hard-to-innovate industries. To test the
hypothesis, we divide the full sample into hard-to-innovate and easy-to-innovate subsamples and
re-estimate the baseline R&D model separately. We also add to the baseline R&D model an inter-
action term between the hard-to-innovate dummy and the election dummy.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Table 8 reports the estimation results from this analysis. The results indicate that there is a
significant difference in the marginal impact of political uncertainty on firm R&D spending across
industries. Coefficients in columns (1) and (2) suggest that firms in the hard-to-innovate category
experience a 9.2% increase in election year R&D intensities, while the increase is only 2.4% for
firms in the easy-to-innovate group. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive,
statistically significant, and suggests that the R&D intensities of hard-to-innovate firms increased
by 8.0% relative to easy-to-innovate firms in election years. Overall, the results lend support to
our hypothesis that R&D projects’ high degree of technical uncertainty and long investment lags
amplify the positive effect of political uncertainty on R&D spending.
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3.8. Robustness Tests
In this subsection, we perform several additional tests to ensure that the preceding results are
robust to various subsample and subperiod analyses, variable definitions and alternative model
specifications. Panel A of Table 9 presents estimation results using the baseline R&D models
across all specifications. Panel B of Table 9 further estimate one-step dynamic panel generalized
method of moments (GMM) in first differences to eliminate firm effects.
First, there might be potential concerns with the one-way clustering of standard errors by firm
only used in the baseline regression specification (Petersen (2009)). To address this concern, in
column (1), Panel A of Table 9, we experiment with calculating standard errors based on two-way
clustering by both firm and year and re-estimate the baseline model. We find slightly weaker but
qualitatively the same results.28
Second, as mentioned earlier, OTC firms tend to be small technology stocks. The average
inflation adjusted (to 2013) firm size of an OTC stock is $181.4 million, as compared with $2,010.2
million for the exchange-listed sample. The small size of these OTC firms may result in ratios that
are highly variable and very large (in absolute value), which could give them disproportionate
impact on the results. To account for this problem, we perform subsample analysis by splitting the
full sample into exchange traded firms (exchg = 11, 12, 14) and OTC traded firms (exchg = 13,
19). Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A report results from this analysis. In both cases, the coefficient
estimates on the election dummy are significant and of similar magnitude as that in the overall
sample. This finding indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by those small technology
28As noted in Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011), two-way clustering of standard errors is only valid provided:
(i) Both N and T are “large”; and (ii) The aggregate shocks must dissipate over time. In such cases, clustering by two
dimensions will likely produce unbiased standard errors. Apparently, our sample only satisfies the second requirement
but doesn’t fit the first, as in our sample N exceeds 9,000 firms but the average T is around 10 years with a maximum of
38 years. As such, we choose to report the baseline results based on standard errors computed from one-way clustering
by firm only, which is the most appropriate in a panel with a large cross-section of firms but a small number of periods
(Petersen (2009)).
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stocks, instead, the positive impact of political uncertainty on R&D spending is present for both
exchange traded and OTC traded firms.
Third, we perform several robustness tests on the sample selection. For example, columns (4)
and (5) of Panel A show that the positive effect of political uncertainty on R&D intensity remains
after removing observations during the dot-com bubble period (1999-2000) or financial crisis pe-
riod (2007-2008) respectively. To ensure that our results are not driven by a small number of large
states with disproportionate representation in our sample, in column (6), we drop the three states
with the highest number of firms (namely, California, Massachusetts and New York together make
up about 35.5% of the total sample) and re-estimate the models. Our conclusions are not sensitive
to exclusion of these states. Similarly, in column (7), we exclude firms operating in business ser-
vices, electronic equipment and pharmaceutical products industries and find qualitatively the same
results.29 These robustness checks help mitigate the concerns that our results might be driven by a
small number of dominant states or industries.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
While we control for various measures of time-varying firm characteristics and state economic
conditions, there may be some concern that our results might be coming from some underlying
regional or nonlinear time trends in our data, which is not captured by the election year dummy
variables alone. In column (8), Panel A of Table 9, we perform a random placebo (falsification)
test to rule out this possibility. Specifically, we falsify the gubernatorial election dates by randomly
assigning the election years to each state following a four-year cycle. We also require that the
relative frequency of randomly assigned election events each state matches the relative frequency of
actual gubernatorial elections. In doing this, we end up with a random placebo dummy variable that
looks like the actual election year indicator used in the previous regressions, except that the timing
is randomly selected across states. Thus, if a temporal regional or nonlinear trend were driving the
29Industry classification is based on Fama-French 48 industries.
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results in our earlier specifications, we would expect a positive and significant coefficient on the
random dummy variable. Column (8) of Panel A reports the estimates from this random placebo
test. All of the estimates on the control variables are similar as in the earlier specifications. As
expected, the coefficient estimate on this random dummy variable is close to zero and insignificant,
indicating that the variation in R&D intensity is specific to the actual election years and not due to
some temporal regional or nonlinear trends in the data.
An alternative to the fixed effects OLS estimation of a static model is the dynamic panel GMM
estimation developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and this method has been used in several recent
studies on corporate investment (Brown et al. (2009) and Guariglia et al. (2011)). To address the
influence of potential dynamic endogeneity, we estimate one-step GMM models in first differences
and report the estimation results in Panel B of Table 9. The GMM models includes one lag of the
dependent variable in column (1) and two lags of the dependent variable in column (2) respectively.
Aggregate year dummies are included in all regression specifications. T-statistics are based on
robust, firm-clustered standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Sargan is a test of the null hypothesis that the overidentification restrictions (all instruments) are
valid.
As noted in Panel B of Table 9, coefficient estimates on election year dummy are positive
and statistically significant for both cases, indicating that our main results do not change after
controlling for possible dynamic endogeneity effects using the dynamic panel GMM estimator.
While current R&D investment is significantly and positively related to R&D investment lagged
one year, it is generally not related to R&D investment lagged two years. The AR(1) and AR(2)
tests indicate that the residuals in first differences are correlated, but there is no serial correlation
in second differences. However, it is worth noting that the instruments (e.g., the lags of the left-
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hand-side endogenous variable and the first difference of all right-hand-side exogenous variables)
do not pass the Sargan over-identification tests and may not be completely exogenous.30
In untabulated tests, we experiment with additional robustness checks. First, we use R&D
expenditure scaled by net sales as an alternative measure of R&D intensity and show that our
main finding is robust to the new measure. Second, we add to our final sample those missing
R&D observations from the Compustat database and find that the election year increase in R&D-
to-assets ratio is not driven by the propensity of firms to strategically report R&D spending in
election years. Third, our results are robust to using an alternative measure of firm’s headquarter
state location based on Garcia and Norli (2012)’s dataset on the state-level operations of individual
firms. Garcia and Norli (2012) measure the state exposure of a firm’s business operations to each
U.S. state by conducting a textual analysis to record instances where state names occur in its
annual 10-K filings.31 Further, we repeat the analysis based on Julio and Yook (2012) international
sample and find that our results stay unchanged. Finally, we show that our conclusions remain
unchanged if we only use the subsample of “innovative” firms that are required to have at least one
patent granted over the sample period from 1980 to 2004 in the Compustat/NBER patent merged
database.32
It is ultimately impossible to completely rule out endogeneity in our (or any other) empirical
setting. Nevertheless, the results presented in this subsection are consistent with the baseline re-
sults, indicating a strong positive and causal association between political uncertainty about future
policy and corporate R&D spending.
30In fact, Arellano and Bond (1991) report that the one-step Sargan test tends to overreject in the presence of
heteroskedasticity.
31The dataset of Garcia and Norli (2012) enables us to examine the effect of political uncertainty on the operations
of individual firms across states. In our sample, we find that about 67.5% of firms’ Compustat headquarter state
location is identical to the main state of firms’ operations as reported in Garcia and Norli (2012).
32In order to minimize the truncation bias in the NBER patent/citation database, we follow the conventional ap-
proach (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001)) and stop our sample period in 2004 for this analysis.
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4. Conclusion
The real effects of uncertainty on R&D investment by firms have been of longstanding con-
cern to both academics and practitioners, given that corporate investment in R&D is an important
ingredient of innovation and economic growth. While the real options literature emphasizes that
adjustment costs and partial irreversibility may cause firms to defer R&D investment under in-
creased uncertainty, subsequent theoretical research has explored several other mechanisms (e.g.,
investment lags, rival preemption and growth options) that may restrict a firm’s incentive and abil-
ity to wait, leading to early investment. In this paper, we investigate how an exogenous increase in
political uncertainty arising from the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections impacts firms’ R&D
investment decisions. We find novel and casual empirical evidence that firms respond to increased
political uncertainty by preemptively investing more in R&D in election years. Moreover, the re-
sults from additional analyses suggest that reverse causality and the alternative political business
cycles hypothesis are unlikely to drive this finding. Further investigation reveals several potential
channels of the causal impact. The positive relation between political uncertainty and R&D in-
vestment is especially strongest for firms that: (1) operate in politically sensitive industries, (2)
face greater product market competition, (3) have higher growth options, or (4) belong to hard-to-
innovate industries. Lastly, consistent with the orientation of R&D efforts towards innovation, we
find that facing political uncertainty, firms use their R&D dollars more efficiently by generating
more and better patents around elections.
Our paper highlights that the relationship between investment and political uncertainty depend-
s on the nature of investment and product market competition. Unlike (partly) irreversible fixed
investment, R&D is stimulated by increasing political uncertainty. As such, the long-run impli-
cations of political uncertainty is not clear and warnings to policy makers about avoiding lengthy
debate about future policy is not entirely warranted.
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions
Variable Definition Source
R&D Intensity and Innovation Output Measures
R&D Intensity Calculated as firms’ research and development expenditure (XRD from COMPUSTAT) divided COMPUSTAT
by book value of total assets (AT from COMPUSTAT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Patent Count Natural logarithm of one plus the patent count. Patent count is defined as number of patent NBER Patent
applications filed in year t of each firm. Only patents that are later granted are included. This Database
variable measures innovation quantity. The patent count is set to zero for companies that have
no patent information available from the NBER patent database.
Citation Count Natural logarithm of one plus the citation count. Citation count is defined as number of citations NBER Patent
received by patent applications filed in year t of each firm. This variable measures patent quality. Database
Only patents that are later granted are included. The citation count is set to zero for companies
that have no citation information available from the NBER patent database.
Generality Natural logarithm of one plus the sum of generality scores of all patents filed by firm i in year t. NBER Patent
Generality measures firm level innovation output by considering the versatility of a firm’s patents. Database
An individual patent’s generality score is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the 3-digit
technology class distribution of the citing patents (forward citations). A higher value of generality
score thus indicates that the focal patents impact a broader set of technological areas.
Originality Natural logarithm of one plus the sum of originality scores of all patents filed by firm i in year t. NBER Patent
Originality measures firm-level innovation output by considering the creativity of a firm’s patents. Database
An individual patent’s originality score is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the 3-digit
technology class distribution of the cited patents (backward citations). A higher value of originality
score thus indicates that the focal patents build on a broader set of technological areas.
Gubernatorial Elections
Election (0) Indicator variable takes on a value of one if a gubernatorial election occurred in that state CQE Library
in that year.
Post-election (+1) Indicator variable takes on a value of one for the one-year period after a gubernatorial election CQE Library
occurred in that state.
Republican (R) Indicator variable set equal to one if the incumbent governor is a Republican in state j in year t. CQE Library
Democrat (D) Indicator variable set equal to one if the incumbent governor is a Democrat in state j in year t. CQE Library
Close Election Indicator variable set equal to one if the victory margin, defined as the vote difference between CQE Library
the first place candidate and the second place candidate, is less than 5%. We classify this type
of elections as high uncertainty elections.
Term-limited Indicator variable set equal to one if the incumbent governors are not eligible for re-election CQE Library
Election due to term-limit expiration. We identify term-limited elections as high uncertainty elections.
Firm Specific and State Economics variables
Ln(Asset) Defined as natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (AT from COMPUSTAT) COMPUSTAT
measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Ln(Age) Defined as natural logarithm of one plus the number of years of the corporation has existed COMPUSTAT
from the IPO year to year t.
Ln(Sales) Defined as natural logarithm of one plus the net sales/turnover (SALE from COMPUSTAT) COMPUSTAT
measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Profitability Defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA from COMPUSTAT
COMUSTAT) divided by book value of total asset (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Tangibility Defined as total net property, plant and equipment (PPENT from COMPUSTAT) divided by COMPUSTAT
book value of total asset (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Q Defined as [the market value of equity (PRCC F × CSHO from COMUSTAT) plus book COMPUSTAT
value of assets (AT) minus book value of equity (CEQ from COMUSTAT) minus balance
sheet deferred taxes (TXDB from COMUSTAT)] divided by book value of asset (AT),
measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Cash Flow Firm’s cash flows. It is defined as income before extraordinary items (IB from COMPUSTAT
COMUSTAT) plus depreciation and amortization (DP from COMUSTAT) divided by
book value of asset (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Leverage Firm’s leverage ratio. It is defined as book value of debt (DLTT+DLC from COMUSTAT) COMPUSTAT
divided by book value of total assets (AT) measured at the end of fiscal year t.
CAPEX Firm’s capital expenditure. It is defined as capital expenditure (CAPX from COMUSTAT) COMPUSTAT
divided by book value of total assets (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Herfindahl Index (HHI) An industry-level measure of product market competition, calculated as HHI = ∑Ni=1 S2i , COMPUSTAT
where Si is the market share of firm i’s sales within a 3-digit SIC industry at the end of
fiscal year and the summation is performed over all firms in that industry. By construction,
HHI measures the degree of product market concentration and a lower product market
concentration indicates higher competition and vice versa.
GDP Growth State level annual GDP growth rate, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis BEA
(BEA) database.
Unemployment Rate State level annual unemployment rate, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis BEA
(BEA) database.
Politically Sensitive Indicator variable set equal to one for firms that belong to the following industries: Tobacco Herron et al.
Industries (PSIs) Products (5), Pharmaceuticals (13), Health Care Services (11), Defense (26), Petroleum and (1999)
Natural Gas (30), Telecommunications (32) and Transportation (40), where the industry
classifications are based on Fama French 48 industries.
Product Market A text-based measure of product market threats/similarity developed by Hoberg et al. (2014). Hoberg et al.
Fluidity It is calculated as the dot product between the words used in a firm’s business description (2014)
from 10-K filings and the change in the words used by its rivals. The fluidity data is from
Hoberg et al. (2014) and covers a large sample of U.S. public firms from 1997 to 2011.
A higher fluidity reflects a greater product market threats from rivals.
High-Tech Indicator variable set equal to one for firms operating in the following high-tech industries: Brown et al.
Industries drugs (283), office equipment and computers (357), communication equipment (366), (2009)
electronic components (367), scientific instruments (382), medical instruments (384), and
software (737). The above industry classification is based on 3-digit SIC codes as defined in
Brown et al. (2009).
Hard-to-innovate Indicator variable set to one for firms that belong to pharmaceutical, medical instrumentation Hall et al. (2005)
Industries chemicals, computers, communications, and electrical industries. The industry classification is
based on 3-digit SIC codes (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang (2014)).
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for gubernatorial elections held between 1976 and 2013 in 48 U.S. states (New
Hampshire and Vermont are excluded from the sample). Panel B reports summary statistics for the firm and state
economics characteristics used in the analysis. Panel C reports summary statistics for R&D intensity in both election
years and nonelection years, where R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenses scaled by book value of total assets.
Panel D reports the annual mean R&D intensity around the elections, where year 0 indicates the actual gubernatorial
election year. See the Appendix for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources.
Panel A: Election Characteristics
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
Gubernatorial Elections 437
Incumbent Republican (R) 198
Incumbent Democrat (D) 233
Incumbent Other (O) 6
Victory Margin (%) 437 15.65 11.92 13.17
Close Election (%) 99 2.41 2.54 1.41
Term-limited Election 120
Panel B: Firm and State Economics Variables
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
R&D Intensity 90,637 0.0833 0.0320 0.1469
Q 90,637 1.9348 1.1691 2.6592
Cash Flow 90,637 -0.0352 0.0679 0.3723
Ln(Age) 90,637 2.2958 2.3979 0.8393
Ln(Sales) 90,637 4.5355 4.3941 2.2644
Tangibility 90,637 0.2321 0.1865 0.1913
Profitability 90,637 0.0231 0.1017 0.3008
Leverage 90,637 0.2154 0.1581 0.2553
Herfindahl 90,637 0.2531 0.1788 0.2224
GDP Growth (%) 90,637 6.1847 5.8000 3.5363
Unemployment (%) 90,637 6.2797 5.9000 1.9861
Panel C: Mean R&D Intensity in Election Years versus Non-election Years
Election Years 21,636 0.0850 0.0314 0.1527
Non-election Years 69,001 0.0827 0.0322 0.1451
Difference 0.0023
T-statistics 2.00**
Panel D: Mean R&D Intensity around Election Years
Year -1 0 +1
N 21,675 21,636 22,030
R&D Intensity 0.0826 0.0850 0.0819
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Table 2
Political Uncertainty and R&D Intensity: Baseline Results
The unit of observation is at firm-year level. The dependent variable in all regressions is R&D intensity, defined as the
ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Independent variables include Q, Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility,
Profitability, Leverage, Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate and unemployment rate and and the Election
year indicator (year 0). See Appendix A for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources. Variable of interest
is the election year indicator. We use baseline regression specification and control for firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are reported in square
brackets below coefficient estimates. Data is for the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Election Dummy 0.0038*** 0.0041*** 0.0047*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0038***
[6.25] [6.60] [7.48] [8.16] [8.11] [7.53] [7.51] [7.72]
Q 0.0038*** 0.0034*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0036***
[7.46] [8.01] [8.22] [8.86] [8.87] [8.91]
Cash Flow -0.1576*** -0.1540*** -0.0462*** -0.0462*** -0.0462***
[-24.53] [-23.81] [-7.48] [-7.48] [-7.48]
Ln(Age) 0.0106*** 0.0023* 0.0024* 0.0033**
[7.88] [1.78] [1.83] [2.50]
Ln(Sales) -0.0068*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0028***
[-6.80] [2.70] [2.70] [2.88]
Tangibility 0.0839*** 0.0839*** 0.0837***
[12.36] [12.36] [12.34]
Profitability -0.2111*** -0.2111*** -0.2117***
[-21.30] [-21.30] [-21.32]
Leverage -0.0134*** -0.0134*** -0.0132***
[-3.19] [-3.20] [-3.13]
Herfindahl 0.0066 0.0035
[0.59] [0.31]
Herfindahl2 -0.0116 -0.0090
[-1.19] [-0.94]
GDP Growth 0.0005***
[4.84]
Unemployment 0.0008***
[3.43]
Constant 0.0905*** 0.0823*** 0.0748*** 0.0700*** 0.0765*** 0.0451*** 0.0446*** 0.0336***
[64.80] [561.51] [72.12] [74.24] [22.50] [11.50] [9.98] [6.14]
N 90,637 90,637 90,637 90,637 90,637 90,637 90,637 90,637
R2 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.250 0.253 0.345 0.346 0.346
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3
Subsample Analysis: Degree of Electoral Uncertainty and R&D Intensity
This table examines whether the degree of electoral uncertainty amplifies the effect of political uncertainty on firm level
R&D intensity. We use election closeness and term limit expiration to proxy for the degree of electoral uncertainty.
Specifically, close election is an indicator variable set equal to one if the victory margin, defined as the vote difference
between the first place candidate and the second place candidate, is less than 5% and zero otherwise. Term-limited
election is an indicator variable set equal to one if the incumbent governors are not eligible for re-election due to
term limit expiration and zero otherwise. We identify close elections and term-limited elections as high uncertainty
elections. For each indicator, we first perform subsample analysis by splitting the full sample into two subgroups
according to the indicator and then examine the interaction between the election year dummy and the indicator. Each
column is based on such a political regime indicator, denoted by the column heading. The unit of observation is at
firm-year level. The dependent variable in all regressions is R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure
to total assets. Independent variables include Q, Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility, Profitability, Leverage,
Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate and unemployment rate and and the Election year indicator (year 0).
See Appendix A for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources. Variables of interests are the election year
indicator and the interaction term. We use baseline regression specification and control for firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are reported in square
brackets below coefficient estimates. To save space, we suppress the estimates of firm specific and state economics
control variables. Data is for the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity
Election Closeness Term Limit
Non-close Election Close Elections Interacted Without Term Limit With Term Limit Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election Dummy 0.0028*** 0.0058*** 0.0029*** 0.0032*** 0.0056*** 0.0032***
[4.97] [6.03] [5.14] [6.13] [4.57] [6.16]
Election × Indicator 0.0031*** 0.0024*
[2.76] [1.82]
N 84,803 74,835 90,637 85,960 73,678 90,637
R2 0.344 0.342 0.346 0.340 0.347 0.346
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4
Political Uncertainty and R&D Intensity: Political Regime
This table examines whether incumbent governor’s party affiliation (i.e., Republican vs. Democrat) affects the pattern
of firm level R&D intensity around elections. Regime is an indicator variable set equal to one if the governor is
a Republican in state j in year t, and zero otherwise. In column (1), we include a post-election indicator in our
baseline regression specification to provide a more detailed estimation of the dynamics of R&D intensity around the
full election cycle. To investigate the cross-sectional heterogeneity in party affiliation, we then split the full sample
into two subgroups based on the regime indicator and perform subsample analysis in columns (2) and (3). In column
(4), we further add to the baseline regression interaction terms between regime indicator and election year dummy, and
between regime indicator and post-election year dummy. Each column is based on such a political regime indicator,
denoted by the column heading. The unit of observation is at firm-year level. The dependent variable in all regressions
is R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Variables of interests are the two interaction
terms, election × regime indicator and post-election × regime indicator, along with the election year (0) and post-
election year (+1) dummies, with year 0 being the year the actual election occurred. We use baseline regression
specification and control for firm and year fixed effects. To save space, we suppress the estimates of firm specific and
state economics control variables. See Appendix A for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are reported in square brackets
below coefficient estimates. Data is for the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity
Full Sample Republican Regime Democratic Regime Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Election Dummy (0) 0.0037*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0037***
[6.99] [4.22] [5.22] [5.39]
Post-election Dummy (+1) -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
[-0.35] [-0.39] [-0.13] [-0.42]
Election × Regime Indicator -0.0000
[-0.04]
Post-election × Regime Indicator 0.0002
[0.19]
Regime Indicator 0.0018*
[1.82]
N 90,637 47,036 43,601 90,637
R2 0.346 0.347 0.347 0.346
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tests for linear combinations of coefficients
Election + Post-election 0.0035*** 0.0032** 0.0035*** 0.0035***
t-statistics [4.02] [2.54] [3.02] [2.77]
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Table 5
Industry Characteristics: Politically Sensitive Industries
This table examines the cross-sectional variations of politically sensitive industries on firm level R&D intensity in
election years. Specifically, politically sensitive industries (PSIs) is an indicator variable set equal to one if firms fall
into the following industries: Tobacco Products (5), Pharmaceuticals (13), Health Care Services (11), Defense (26),
Petroleum and Natural Gas (30), Telecommunications (32) and Transportation (40), as used in Herron et al. (1999)
and Julio and Yook (2012). Fama French 48 industries is used as the industry classification. In the first two columns,
we perform subsample analysis by splitting the full sample into two subgroups according to the politically sensitive in-
dustry indicator and then examine the interactive effects between the election year dummy and the politically sensitive
industry indicator in the last column. Each column is based on such a subsample, indicated by the column heading.
The unit of observation is at firm-year level. The dependent variable in all regressions is R&D intensity, defined as the
ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Independent variables include Q, Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility,
Profitability, Leverage, Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate and unemployment rate and and the Election
year indicator (year 0). See Appendix A for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources. Variables of interests
are the election year dummy and the interaction term. We use baseline regression specification and control for firm
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics
are reported in square brackets below coefficient estimates. To save space, we suppress the estimates of firm specific
and state economics control variables. Data is for the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity
Politically Sensitive Industries (PSIs)
Politically Sensitive Non-sensitive Interacted
(1) (2) (3)
Election Dummy 0.0125*** 0.0020*** 0.0021***
[5.65] [5.36] [5.51]
Election × PSIs 0.0116***
[4.69]
N 12,788 77,849 90,637
R2 0.523 0.261 0.346
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6
Industry Characteristics: Product Market Competition
This table examines whether product market competition amplifies the effect of political uncertainty on firm level R&D
intensity. We use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and product market fluidity to proxy for the degree of product
market competition. Specifically, the industry-level measure, HHI, is calculated as HHI = ∑Ni=1 S2i , where Si is the
market share of firm i’s sales within a 3-digit SIC industry and the summation is performed over the total number of N
firms in that industry. By construction, HHI measures the degree of product market concentration and a lower product
market concentration indicates higher competition and vice versa. The firm level measure, fluidity, is a text-based
measure of product market threats, which captures firm’s product similarity from its rivals. The fluidity data is from
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) and covers a large sample of U.S. public firms from 1997 to 2011. A higher
fluidity reflects a greater product market threats from rivals. For each product market competition indicator, we first
perform subsample analysis by splitting the full sample into two subgroups according to the indicator and then examine
the interaction between the election year dummy and the indicator. Each column is based on such a product market
competition indicator, denoted by the column heading. The unit of observation is at firm-year level. The dependent
variable is R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Independent variables include Q,
Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility, Profitability, Leverage, Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate
and unemployment rate and and the Election year indicator (year 0). See Appendix A for variable descriptions and
the variable sources. Variables of interests are the election year indicator and the interaction term. We use baseline
regression specification and control for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are reported in square brackets below coefficient estimates. To save space,
we suppress the estimates of firm specific and state economics control variables. Sample period is from 1976 to 2013
(1997 to 2011) for the HHI (fluidity) measure. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D intensity
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) Product Market Fluidity
Low HHI High HHI Interacted High Fluidity Low Fluidity Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election Dummy 0.0056*** 0.0009** 0.0014*** 0.0087*** 0.0018*** 0.0023***
[6.60] [2.08] [3.00] [5.73] [3.49] [3.66]
Election × Indicator 0.0045*** 0.0067***
[4.53] [4.08]
Indicator 0.0063*** -0.0027*
[4.75] [-1.71]
N 44,901 45,736 90,637 18,525 18,525 37,050
R2 0.416 0.247 0.346 0.461 0.232 0.416
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7
Industry Characteristics: Growth Options
This table examines whether growth options exacerbate or attenuate the positive effect of political uncertainty on firm
level R&D intensity. Following the literature, we use firm-specific Tobin’s Q and whether firms belong to a high-tech
industry to measure firms’ growth opportunities. Specifically, Tobin’s Q represents the ratio of the market value of
assets to the book value of assets. A higher Q indicates higher growth and investment opportunities for the firm,
and vice versa. High Q is an indicator variable set equal to one for firms with above industry median Q each year.
High-tech firms as opposed to non high-tech firms are supposed to have more growth options. High-tech industry is an
indicator variable set equal to one for firms operating in the following seven high-tech industries: drugs (283), office
equipment and computers (357), communication equipment (366), electronic components (367), scientific instruments
(382), medical instruments (384), and software (737). The classification is based on 3-digit SIC codes as defined in
Brown et al. (2009). For each growth options indicator, we first perform subsample analysis by splitting the full
sample into two subgroups according to either the median industry Q or the high-tech industry indicator. To facilitate
comparison, we then examine the interaction between the election year dummy and the growth options indicator in
the baseline R&D regression specification. Each column is based on such a growth options indicator, denoted by the
column heading. The unit of observation is at firm-year level. The dependent variable is R&D intensity, defined as the
ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Independent variables include Q, Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility,
Profitability, Leverage, Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate and unemployment rate and and the Election
year indicator (year 0). See Appendix A for variable descriptions and the variable sources. Variables of interests are
the election year indicator and the interaction term. We use baseline regression specification and control for firm and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are
reported in square brackets below coefficient estimates. To save space, we suppress the estimates of firm specific and
state economics control variables. Data is for the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D intensity
Tobin’s Q High-Tech Firms
High Q Low Q Interacted High-Tech Non High-Tech Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election Dummy 0.0041*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0071*** 0.0010*** 0.0008**
[4.96] [4.58] [4.33] [7.15] [2.81] [2.07]
Election × Indicator 0.0021** 0.0069***
[2.07] [6.49]
Indicator 0.0149*** –
[14.58] –
N 45,321 45,316 90,637 39,092 51,545 90,637
R2 0.372 0.288 0.350 0.405 0.220 0.346
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8
Industry Characteristics: Hard-to-Innovate Industries
This table examines the cross-sectional variations of hard-to-innovate industries on firm level R&D intensity in election
years. Following the work of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang (2014), we classify firms in
pharmaceuticals, medical instrumentation, chemicals, computers, communications, and electrical industries as hard-
to-innovate industries. while easy-to-innovate industries include software programming, internet applications and
other miscellaneous industries. We therefore set a hard-to-innovate indicator to one if a firm belongs to one of these
hard-to-innovate industries. To test the hypothesis, we first perform subsample analysis by splitting the full sample
into two industry subgroups (hard- vs. easy-to-innovate) according to the hard-to-innovate indicator. To facilitate
comparison, we then add to the baseline R&D regression an interaction term between the election year dummy and
the hard-to-innovate indicator. Each column is based on such a subsample, indicated by the column heading. The
unit of observation is at firm-year level. The dependent variable in all regressions is R&D intensity, defined as the
ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Independent variables include Q, Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility,
Profitability, Leverage, Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate and unemployment rate and and the Election
year indicator (year 0). See Appendix A for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources. Variables of interests
are the election year indicator and the interaction term. We use baseline regression specification and control for firm
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics
are reported in square brackets below coefficient estimates. To save space, we suppress the estimates of firm specific
and state economics control variables. Data is for the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D intensity
Hard-to-Innovate Industries
Hard-to-Innovate Easy-to-Innovate Interacted
(1) (2) (3)
Election Dummy 0.0077*** 0.0020*** 0.0022***
[5.40] [5.14] [5.29]
Election × Hard-to-Innovate 0.0067***
[4.26]
N 21,618 69,019 90,637
R2 0.480 0.243 0.346
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
57
Table 9
Political Uncertainty and R&D Intensity: Robustness Tests
This table presents robustness tests for the baseline R&D intensity results shown in Table 2. The unit of observation is
at firm-year level. The dependent variable in all regressions is R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure
to total assets. Independent variables include Q, Cash flow, Ln(Age), Ln(Sales), Tangibility, Profitability, Leverage,
Herfindahl, Herfindahl2, State GDP growth rate and unemployment rate and and the Election year indicator (year 0).
See Appendix A for variable descriptions as well as the variable sources. Variable of interest is the election year
indicator. In Panel A of Table 9, we use baseline R&D regression specification and control for firm and year fixed
effects. Specifically, in column (1), we cluster standard errors by firm and year following Petersen (2009). Column
(2) reports regression results based on the subsample of firms listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq only (Exchg =
11, 12, 14), while column (3) presents the results based on the over-the-counter (OTC) traded firms (Exchg = 13,
19). In columns (4) and (5), we remove observations in the dot-com bubble period (i.e., 1999-2000) and financial
crisis period (i.e., 2007-2008) respectively. Column (6) excludes firms headquartered in California, Massachusetts and
New York and Column (7) excludes firms operating in business services, electronic equipment and pharmaceutical
products industries, where industry classification is based on Fama French 48 industries. In column (8), we present
regression results from a placebo (falsification) test, where election events are randomly generated every four years
for each state. Standard errors in columns (2) to (9) are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity.
In Panel B of Table 9, we further estimate one-step GMM in first differences to eliminate firm effects. The GMM
models includes one lag of the dependent variable in column (1) and two lags of the dependent variable in column (2)
respectively. Aggregate year dummies are included in all regression specifications. T-statistics are based on robust,
firm-clustered standard errors. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Sargan is a test of the null hypothesis that the
overidentification restrictions (all instruments) are valid. T-statistics are reported in square brackets below coefficient
estimates. To save space, we suppress the estimates of firm specific and state economics control variables. Data is for
the period 1976 to 2013. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Baseline R&D Regressions
Dependent variable: R&D intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Election Dummy 0.0038** 0.0033*** 0.0051*** 0.0032*** 0.0044*** 0.0025*** 0.0016*** 0.0005
[2.16] [6.55] [4.52] [6.34] [8.89] [4.85] [4.09] [0.66]
N 89,570 65,264 25,373 83,909 85,760 58,504 63,400 80,797
R2 0.275 0.362 0.343 0.354 0.329 0.323 0.260 0.355
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Dynamic R&D Regressions
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity
(1) (2)
Election Dummy 0.0032*** 0.0029***
[6.27] [5.64]
R&D Intensityt−1 0.2021*** 0.1984***
[10.70] [9.29]
R&D Intensityt−2 -0.0145
[-1.25]
N 69,626 61,401
AR(1) (p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) (p-value) (0.12) (0.16)
Sargan (p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Firm Specific Controls Yes Yes
State Economics Controls Yes Yes
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